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  • 标题:Vertical Externalities in a Tax Setting in a System of Hierarchical Governments
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Chao-Lan Wang ; Yi-Chung Hsu
  • 期刊名称:Theoretical Economics Letters
  • 印刷版ISSN:2162-2078
  • 电子版ISSN:2162-2086
  • 出版年度:2013
  • 卷号:3
  • 期号:3
  • 页码:135-141
  • DOI:10.4236/tel.2013.33021
  • 出版社:Scientific Research Publishing
  • 摘要:This paper focuses on the overlap in the tax bases between two levels of government. This overlap leads to vertical fiscal externalities that arise when several different commodities are in the tax base and the tax bases of the two levels of government may not be identical. In the unified government’s case, if it is supposed that the marginal utilities of income for the two states are the same, the tax policy in state i not only considers the price elasticity and cross elasticity of each state, but also the shares of expenditure on commodities x1 and x2 in the different states. When the cross elasticity is zero, the tax rates on the same commodity sold in the different states and the price elasticity should be inversely related. If the cross elasticity of the commodities is zero, the higher the marginal utility of income of state i, the lower should be the tax rate set by the unified government in state i.
  • 关键词:Vertical Externality; Optimal Tax Rate
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