摘要：A sentence like (1a), unlike the minimally different (1b), sounds odd. However, the contrast is surprising: we know that all Italians come from the same country, hence (1a) and (1b) are truth-conditionally equivalent given common knowledge. (1) a. #Some Italians come from a warm country (Magri 2010) b. Italians come from a warm country Magri (2010) proposes that the source of the oddness of (1a) is its scalar implicature (SI) in (2), which contradicts common knowledge (see also Magri 2011). To make this work, Magri (2010) assumes a theory of SIs with the properties in (3a) and (3b). (2) Not all Italians come from a warm country (3) a. The computation of SIs is blind to common knowledge. b. The computation of SIs is mandatory. (3a) is needed or (2) would not even be generated in the first place and (3b) is needed or (2) would have just been suspended or cancelled. Magri (2010) obtains (3b) by assuming that SIs are obligatorily computed at every scope site. A question for this account is how to account for the context dependence of SIs. Magri (2010)’s response, building on Fox and Katzir (2011), is relativizing the computation of SIs to relevant alternatives, so that for each alternative, either it’s not relevant or it gives rise to a scalar implicature corresponding to its negation. In other words, he proposes the generalization in (4). (4) When alternatives are relevant the corresponding SIs are obligatory.
