期刊名称：Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics
电子版ISSN：1664-5278
出版年度：2012
卷号：4
页码：167-181
出版社：European Society for Aesthetics
摘要：In front of cognitivist models of appreciation, Brady’s account of aesthetic appreciation of nature is built upon imagina- tion linked to perception. Brady considers imagination as consist- ing in four kinds of activities: exploration, projection, ampliation, and revelation. For imagination being safe from irrelevant contents, she imposes on it two limits: disinterestedness, and the guide of the “imagining-well”, as an analogy with a practical virtue. I will propose an extended interpretation of her account by questioning the lim- its of her auto objection. Through four given examples, I will try to show the accuracy that a less restrictive account of imagination may have within her own model.
