摘要：While nuclear deterrence theory may be well-suited to dealing with nuclear-armed states, itssuitability for deterring nuclear terrorism has frequently been questioned since 9/11. While terroristorganizations do not necessarily act uniformly or according to the same underlying beliefs, many ofthe most aggressive organizations are motivated by an ideology that embraces martyrdom and anapocalyptic vision.1 This ideology may be based on religion or a desire to overthrow a government.Consequently, terrorists motivated by ideology who intend to use a stolen or improvised nucleardevice against the United States or its interests may not care about the resulting military repercussionsfollowing a nuclear attack. In such a scenario, some strategists think a terrorist organization'sleadership may prove "undeterrable" by traditional military means. Nevertheless, deterrence is still acritical element in U.S. national strategy to prevent a nuclear attack. Furthermore, deterrencecombined with dissuasion works to reduce the likelihood of nuclear terrorism being used against theUnited States, while also mitigating the consequences should such an act actually occur
