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  • 标题:Two-Player Lopsided Contests under Different Timing Assumptions
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Kyung Hwan Baik
  • 期刊名称:Theoretical Economics Letters
  • 印刷版ISSN:2162-2078
  • 电子版ISSN:2162-2086
  • 出版年度:2013
  • 卷号:3
  • 期号:5B
  • 页码:1-4
  • DOI:10.4236/tel.2013.35A2001
  • 出版社:Scientific Research Publishing
  • 摘要:I study contests in which two asymmetric players compete with each other by expending irreversible efforts to win a prize. I consider three types of games, which are distinguished by their different timing assumptions: the simultaneous-move game, the sequential-move game, and the game with endogenous timing. I compare the outcomes obtained under the different timing assumptions.
  • 关键词:Contest; Rent Seeking; Timing Assumptions; Underdog; Favorite
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