摘要：I will illustrate that "abduction" – or reasoning to hypotheses – is central to understanding some features of the problem of "inferring reasons" in ethics. I contend that ethical deliberation, as a form of practical reasoning, shares many aspects with hypothetical explanatory reasoning (selection and creation of hypothesis, inference to the best explanation, model-based reasoning, manipulatory cognition) as it is described by abductive reasoning in science. Of course in the moral case we have reasons that support conclusions instead of explanations that account for data, like in epistemological settings. To support this perspective, I propose a new analysis of the "logical structure of reasons", which supports the thesis that we can look to scientific thinking and problem solving for models of practical reasoning. The distinction between "internal" and "external" reasons is fundamental: internal reasons are based on a desire or on an intention, whereas external reasons are, for instance, based on external obligations and duties we can possibly recognize as such. Some of these external reasons can be grounded in what I call "moral mediators" of various types. I will also illustrate how this activity of practical reasoning takes advantage of hybrid representations bringing up the question of how multimodal aspects involving a full range of sensory modalities are important in it. Finally, it will be important to illustrate why it is difficult to "deductively" grasp practical reasoning, at least when we are aided only by classical logic; complications arise from the intrinsic multiplicity of possible reasons and from the fact that in practical reasoning we can often hold two or more inconsistent reasons at the same time
