出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between twoparties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for somevalues of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the uniqueequilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached.Secondly, even when there are equilibria in which an agreement isreached, we find that the model always has an equilibrium in whichagreement is never reached, as well as equilibria in which agreement isdelayed for an arbitrary length of time.Finally, the only way in which the parties can reach an agreement inequilibrium is by using inefficient punishments for (some of) theopponent's deviations. We argue that this implies that, when the partiesare given the opportunity to renegotiate out of these inefficiencies, theonly equilibrium outcome which survives is the one in which agreementis never reached, regardless of the value of the transaction costs
