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文章基本信息

  • 标题:Can tournaments induce rational play in the centipede game? Exploring dominance vs. strategic uncertainty
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Christopher R Mcintosh ; Jason F Shogren ; Andrew J Moravec
  • 期刊名称:Economics Bulletin
  • 电子版ISSN:1545-2921
  • 出版年度:2009
  • 卷号:29
  • 期号:3
  • 页码:2018-2024
  • 出版社:Economics Bulletin
  • 摘要:We compare behavior in a one-shot Centipede game across several payoff structures including nonlinear payoff tournaments. Assuming Nash to be optimal, results suggest nonlinear tournament payoffs based on overall relative rewards are not sufficient to increase Nash results in the one-shot Centipede style setting. Evidence suggests that reducing strategic uncertainty is more important than increasing dominance in promoting Nash play
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