期刊名称：Hyle : International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry
印刷版ISSN：1433-5158
出版年度：2009
卷号：15
期号：1
页码：5-14
出版社：HYLE Publications, Karlsruhe and University of Karlsruhe
摘要：This paper discusses the common view that nanotechnology blurs the boundary between nature and artifact. At first glance, this claim seems to be justified by the 'artificial molecular machines' which play a central role in the development of nanotechnology. However in considering a few examples of design of artificial molecular machines, I first argue that the dual trend of artificialization of nature and naturalization of artifacts is not consistent. This antinomy is based on a tacit and never-questioned metaphysical assumption: nature and artifacts cannot be ontologically balanced. Their opposition relies on other conceptual divides between structure and operation, between being and becoming in classical metaphysics. I try to demonstrate that nanotechnol-ogy undermines this traditional metaphysical view. Nature cannot be de-scribed as a separate and permanent entity. It is more adequately characterized as a set of processes homogeneous with technological processes. Thus, far from erasing nature, nanotechnology conveys an operational view of nature that precisely belongs to a Techno-logy
