期刊名称：Reason Papers : A Journal of Interdisciplinary Normative Studies
印刷版ISSN：0363-1893
出版年度：2006
卷号：28
页码：125-131
出版社：Reason Papers
摘要：It has long been a dogma in some quarters that value judgments are radically different from factual judgments, that they are "subjective" or "untestable" in a way that factual judgments are not. This fact/value dichotomy has become so widely accepted that I can recall my high school teachers in the 1970s reciting it as an uncontroversial truism; and even my college students today, most of whom are religiously conservative Alabamians unlikely to harbor sympathies for ethical relativism, can be counted on to confront assertions in ethics with the question "Who's to say what's right or wrong." on the clear assumption that the question is unanswerable
