期刊名称：Reason Papers : A Journal of Interdisciplinary Normative Studies
印刷版ISSN：0363-1893
出版年度：1986
卷号：11
出版社：Reason Papers
摘要：I would like to serve as devil's advocate by raising some particular questions about David Norton's brief defense in "Is 'Flourishing' a ~;ueA lternative Ethics?" of his version of an ethics of flourishing, with the aim of getting him to say a bit more. "The flourishing of artifacts, organs, and animals is non-moral for they have no choice in the matter; human flourishing fulfills the moral condition of choice, for the will of the individual must be enlisted if flourishing is to occur." Despite the Aristotelian precedent, I think this cannot be right. One might very well believe (as I do) that animals make choices, without being forced to conclude that the flourishing of such animals is moral. The issues are independent. "Functional evaluation of artifacts, organs, and animals is secondary to and derivative from human flourishing because human flourishing is the agency by which value is realized in the world." This also seems wrong to me. Some plants had good roots before there were any people, and would have had good roots even if there had never been any people.
