期刊名称：Reason Papers : A Journal of Interdisciplinary Normative Studies
印刷版ISSN：0363-1893
出版年度：1981
卷号：7
出版社：Reason Papers
摘要：As Renford Bambrough indicates with the title of his book, Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge (Atlantic Highlands. N. J. : Humanities Press, 1979), the issues addressed here concern moral epistemology, and the central question of the book is the place of reason in ethical judgments. Bambrough's principal object of criticism is the skeptic or relativist who doubts or denies the objectivity of moral judgments. Thus, his purpose is to "show that 'the ordinary moral consciousness' is right in regarding itself as a consciousness, as an awareness of things that are not dependent for their existence or properties upon the fact of being apprehended." To this end, Bambrough directs his energies essentially to the task of correcting the misconceptions of the nature and role of reason in moral inquiry and judgment.
