摘要：The precautionary principle is often proposed as a guide to action in environmental management or risk assessment,and has been incorporated in various legal and regulatory contexts. For many, it reflects the common sense notion of being saferather than sorry, but it has attracted numerous critics. At times, proponents and critics talk at cross purposes, due to the multiplicityof ways the precautionary principle has been formulated. The approach taken here is to examine four general varieties ofprecaution, relating each to arguments made in various contexts by others. First, I examine the parallel between the precautionaryprinciple and an argument referred to as Pascal's wager. Critics are right to dismiss versions of the precautionary principle thatfollow the logic of Pascal's wager, because that argument requires assumption of an infinite catastrophe, which is seldom thecase in environmental decisions. Second, I explore precaution viewed as an instance of the phenomenon of ambiguity aversionas described by Daniel Ellsberg. Third, I evaluate precautionary perspectives on our duties to future generations, drawinginspiration from the views of Gifford Pinchot. Fourth, I consider the precautionary principle as an instance of Aldo Leopold'snotion of intelligent tinkering. Although controversy persists, I find that a legitimate theoretical foundation exists to implementEllsbergian, Pinchotian and Leopoldean varieties of precaution in environmental decision making. Additionally, I remark onthe role of adaptive management and maintaining resilience in ecological and social systems as an approach to implementingthe precautionary principle
