首页    期刊浏览 2024年09月20日 星期五
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Do Students Behave Rationally in Multiple Choice Tests?  Evidence from a Field Experiment
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:María Paz Espinosa ; Javier Gardeazabal
  • 期刊名称:The Journal of Management and Economics
  • 印刷版ISSN:1819-0917
  • 出版年度:2013
  • 卷号:9
  • 期号:2
  • 出版社:Faculdad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad de Buenos Aires
  • 摘要:

    A disadvantage of multiple choice tests is that students have incentives to guess. To discourage guessing, it is common to use scoring rules that either penalize wrong answers or reward omissions. In psychometrics, penalty and reward scoring rules are considered equivalent. However, experimental evidence indicates that students behave differently under penalty or reward scoring rules. These differences have been attributed to the different framing (penalty versus reward). In this paper, we model students’ behavior in multiple choice tests as a choice among lotteries. We show that strategic equivalence among penalty and reward scoring rules holds only under risk neutrality. Therefore, risk aversion could be an alternative explanation to the previously found differences in students’ behavior when confronted with penalty and reward scoring rules. We suggest the use of a modified penalty scoring rule which is equivalent to the reward rule for whatever risk attitudes students might have. To disentangle the effect of framing and risk aversion on students’ behavior we design a field experiment with three treatments, each one with a different scoring rule. Two of these scoring rules are equivalent but have different framing, while the third is not equivalent but has the same framing as one of the other two. The experimental results indicate that differences in students’ behavior are due to risk aversion and not due to different framing.

  • 关键词:scoring rules; risk aversion; field experiment
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有