出版社：Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universität zu Köln
摘要：Since PV grid parity has already been achieved in Germany, households are given an indirect nancial incentive to invest in PV and battery storage capacities. This paper analyzes the economic consequences of the household's optimization behavior induced by the indirect nancial incentive for in-house PV electricity consumption by combining a household optimization model with an electricity system optimization model. Up to 2050, we nd that households save 10 % - 18 % of their accumulated electricity costs by covering 38 - 57 % of their annual electricity demand with self-produced PV electricity. Overall, cost savings on the household level amount to more than 47 bn e2011 up to 2050. However, while the consumption of self-produced electricity is bene cial from the single household's perspective, it is inecient from the total system perspective. The single household's optimization behavior is found to cause excess costs of 116 bn e2011 accumulated until 2050. Moreover, it leads to signi cant redistributional e ects by raising the nancial burden for (residual) electricity consumers by more than 35 bn e2011 up to 2050. In addition, it yields massive revenue losses on the side of the public sector and network operators of more than 77 and 69 bn e2011 by 2050, respectively. In order to enhance the overall economic eciency, we argue that the nancial incentive for in-house PV electricity consumption should be abolished and that energy-related network tari s should be replaced by tari s which re
ect the costs of grid connection.
