出版社：Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universität zu Köln
摘要：Private operation of port facilities is becoming increasingly common worldwide and many governments consider the privatization of public ports as a policy option. We investigate the e¤ect of port privatization in a setting with two ports located in di¤er- ent countries, serving their home market but also competing for transshipment tra¢ c from a third region. Each government chooses whether to privatize its port or to keep port operations public. We show that there exist equilibria in which the two govern- ments choose privatization. In these equilibria, national welfare is higher relative to a situation where both ports are public. Since port charges are strategic complements, privatization can act as a valuable precommitment tool for the two governments and allows for a better exploitation of the third region. However, from the perspective of maximizing the joint national welfare of both port countries, there is an ine¢ ciently low incentive to privatize. It is also shown that a country with a smaller home market has a larger incentive to choose private port operation.
