出版社：Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universität zu Köln
摘要：Liberalization of network industries frequently separates the network from the other parts of the industry. This is important in particular for the elec- tricity industry where private rms invest into generation facilities, while net- work investments usually are controlled by regulators. We discuss two regulatory regimes. First, the regulator can only decide on the network extension. Second, she can additionally use a "capacity market" with payments contingent on private generation investment. For the rst case, we nd that even absent asymmetric information, a lack of regulatory commitment can cause ine¢ ciently high or in- e¢ ciently low investments. For the second case, we develop a standard handicap auction which implements the rst best under asymmetric information, if there are no shadow costs of public funds. With shadow costs, no simple mechanism can implement the second best outcome
