出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs.A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who canacquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisorwere risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informedsupervisor residual claimant for the hierarchy's profit. Under risk-aversion, the optimal contract trades-off the supervisor's incentives toreveal his information with an insurance motive. This contract can beidentified with the one obtained in a simple hard information model ofhierarchical collusion with exogenous transaction costs. Now,transaction costs are endogenous and depend on the collusion stake,the accuracy of the supervisory technology and the supervisor's degreeof risk-aversion. We then discuss various implications of the model forthe design and management of organisations
