出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：The existence of a negative relationship between cartel stability and the level of excesscapacity in an industry has for a long time been the dominant view in the traditional IOliterature. Recent supergame-theoretic contributions (e.g. Brock and Scheinkman 1985)appear to show that this view is ill-founded. Focussing on the issue of enforcement of cartelrules ("incentive constraints"), however, this literature completely ignores firms'"participation constraints". Reverting the focus of attention, the present paper restores thetraditional view: large cartels will not be sustainable in periods of high excess capacity (lowdemand). In contrast to the supergame-theoretic literature, it predicts a negative relationshipbetween excess capacity and the collusive price
关键词：collusion; excess capacity; business cycle; cartel stability
