出版社：Udruga za promicanje filozofije ; Hrvatski studiji Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
摘要：In the first, shorter part of the paper I point out some problems and potential misunderstandings connected with B. Berčić’s treatment of Nozick’s sensitivity condition for knowledge. In the second part of the paper I offer the condition of modal stability or limited sensitivity as a revision of Nozickian conditions for non-accidental connection between our belief and the truth of our belief. “When it is seriously possible for you to falsely believe that p,” that is a good reason for denying that you know that p. Sensitivity within limits requires that we consider more possible worlds (all within a sphere of serious or relevant possibilities) than classical sensitivity, but not the worlds outside this sphere. The idea of modal stability combines robustness (benefits of safety) with responsiveness to facts (benefits of sensitivity).
