摘要：In contrast to those who more characteristically approach emotion as an individual rea lm of ex perience of more distinc tive physiological and/or psyc hologica l sorts, th is paper address -es emotiona lity as a socially experienced, linguistically enabled, activity-based process. While conceptually and methodologically situated within contemporary symbolic interac-tioni st thought (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Strauss 1993; Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; Prus a nd Grills 2003), this statement is central ly i nformed by the pragmati st considerations of emotiona lity that Aristotle (circa 38 4-322 BCE) develops in Rhetoric.Although barely known to those in the huma n sciences, Aristotle's Rhetoric provides a great deal of insight into people's defin itions of, and experiences with, a wide array of emotions. Addressing matters of persuasive interchange i n political, judicial, and evaluative contexts, Aristotle gives particular attention to the intensification and neutralization of people's emo-tion al states. Th is includes (1) anger and calm, (2) friendsh ip and enmity, (3) fear and confi-dence, (4) shame and shamelessness, (5) kindness and inconsideration, (6) pity and indigna-tion, and (7) envy and emulation.Following an introduction to "rhetoric" (as the study of persuasive interc hange) and "emotional-ity," this paper briefly (1) outli nes a pragmatist/interaction ist approach to the study of emotion-ality, (2) considers Aristotle as a sociological pragmatist, (3) locates Aristotle's work within the context of classical Greek thought, (4) acknowledges the relationship of emotionality and moral-ity, and (5) addresses emotionality as a generic soc ial process. Following (6) a more sustained consideration of emotionality within the context of Aristotle's R hetoric, t he paper co ncludes w ith (7) a short discussion of the importance of Aristotle's work for studying emotionality as a realm of human lived experience on a contemporary plane
