期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：This paper quantifies the deterioration of achievable stabilization outcomes when monetary policy operates under imperfect credibility and weak anchoring of long-term expectations. Within a medium-scale DSGE model, we introduce through a simple signal extraction problem, an imperfect knowledge configuration where price and wage setters wrongly doubt about the determination of the central bank to leave unchanged its longterm inflation objective in the face of inflationary shocks. The magnitude of private sector learning has been calibrated to match the volatility of US inflation expectations at long horizons. Given such illustrative calibrations, we find that the costs of maintaining a given inflation volatility under weak credibility could amount to 0.25 pp of output gap standard deviation.
关键词：Monetary policy; Imperfect credibility; Signal extraction.
