期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2003
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper studies the role of open and closed committee decision making in presence of external in°uence. We show that restricting the information of interest groups may reduce the bias towards special interest politics. Moreover, there are cases where bene¯ts from increasing the number of decision makers can only be reaped if the committee's sessions are not public. In open committees bene¯ts from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This is not the case in a closed committee where costs and bene¯ts of insincere voting only arise when a voter is pivotal.
关键词：Committees; interest groups; voting; common agency.
