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  • 标题:Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Jean-Pierre Vidal ; Marco Catenaro
  • 期刊名称:Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
  • 印刷版ISSN:1830-3420
  • 电子版ISSN:1830-3439
  • 出版年度:2003
  • 出版社:European Central Bank
  • 摘要:In the context of a stylised game theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a co-ordinated outcome can be the solution to the non co-operative tax game. This result suggests that explicit forms of policy co-ordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary.
  • 关键词:Policy Co-ordination; International Fiscal Issues
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