期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2010
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：Banks increasingly use short-term wholesale funds to supplement traditional re- tail deposits. Existing literature mainly points to the "bright side" of wholesale funding: sophisticated nanciers can monitor banks, disciplining bad but re nanc- ing good ones. This paper models a "dark side" of wholesale funding. In an envi- ronment with a costless but noisy public signal on bank project quality, short-term wholesale nanciers have lower incentives to conduct costly monitoring, and instead may withdraw based on negative public signals, triggering ine¢ cient liquidations. Comparative statics suggest that such distortions of incentives are smaller when public signals are less relevant and project liquidation costs are higher, e.g., when banks hold mostly relationship-based small business loans.
