期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2011
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：In Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs) the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge the same nal good price regardless of the means of payment chosen by the customer. In this paper, we analyze a three-party model (consumers, merchants, and proprietary EPNs) to assess the impact of a NSR on the electronic payments system, in particular, on competition among EPNs, network pricing to merchants and consumers, EPNspro ts, and social welfare. We show that imposing a NSR has a number of e¤ects. First, it softens competition among EPNs and rebalances the fee structure in favor of cardholders and to the detriment of merchants. Second, we show that the NSR is a pro table strategy for EPNs if and only if the network e¤ect from merchants to cardholders is su¢ ciently weak. Third, the NSR is socially (un)desirable if the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are su¢ ciently weak (strong) and the merchantsmarket power in the goods market is su¢ ciently high (low). Our policy advice is that regulators should decide on whether the NSR is appropriate on a market-by-market basis instead of imposing a uniform regulation for all markets.
