期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2012
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：We o¤er a theoretical framework to analyze corporate lending when loan o¢ cers must be incentivized to prospect for loans and to transmit the soft information they obtain in that process. We explore how this multi-task agency problem shapes loan o¢ cerscompensation, banksuse of soft information in credit approval, and their lending standards. When competition intensi es, prospecting for loans becomes more important and banksinternal agency problem worsens. In response to more competition, banks lower lending standards, may choose to disregard soft and use only hard information in their credit approval, and in that case reduce loan o¢ cers to salespeople with steep, volume-based compensation. Our model generates excessive lendingas banksoptimal response to an internal agency problem
