期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
出版年度：2013
卷号：2013
出版社：Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
摘要：In premium auctions, the highest losing bidder receives a reward fromthe seller. This paper studies the private value English premium auc-tion (EPA) for di.erent risk attitudes of bidders. We explicitly derivethe symmetric equilibrium for bidders with CARA utilities and con-duct an experimental study to test the theoretical predictions. In ourexperiment, subjects are sorted into risk-averse and risk loving groups.We find that revenues in the EPA are significantly higher when biddersare risk loving rather than risk averse. These results are partly consis-tent with theory and confirm the general view that bidders' risk prefer-ences constitute an important factor that a.ects bidding behavior andconsequently also the seller's expected revenue. However, individualsubjects rarely follow the equilibrium strategy and as a result, revenuein our experiment is lower than in the symmetric equilibrium
