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文章基本信息

  • 标题:OPTIMAL CONTRACTS OF THE MAIN-AGENT MODEL IN CONDITIONS OF SYMMETRIC INFORMATION
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Tudor Colomeischi
  • 期刊名称:Economics and Finance Review
  • 电子版ISSN:2047-0401
  • 出版年度:2011
  • 卷号:1
  • 期号:6
  • 页码:60-68
  • 出版社:Global Research Society
  • 摘要:This paper draws up an approach over the Main Agent model, in conditions of information symmetry. At the beginning, the Main Agent model is emphasized in a general way, mentioning the main contributions brought in time on its development, its characteristics and the basic principles. Then, the hypothesis of the general model is illustrated, drawing a conclusion as regards the model's situations: Main neutral and Agent with risk aversion, Agent neutral and Main with risk aversion, and both partners having risk aversion
  • 关键词:symmetric information; Principal-Agent model; optimal contracts; optimal salary; optimal effort ;level
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