摘要：I challenge two fundamental assumptions of Tugendhat’s ethical theory. First, I raise doubts about Tugendhat’s claim that every morality which fi ts the formal concept of morality as a system of reciprocal demands presupposes a basic equality of all members of the moral community. Second, I query whether the justifi cation of a modern, secular and autonomous morality can rely only on the interests of individuals. Regarding the fi rst point I contend that the equality which Tugendhat locates in the very structure of morality has to be seen as the result of cultural changes and innovations. And as far as the second point is concerned I argue that besides individual interests there are other reasons (e.g. reasons of fairness and the avoidance of cruelty) supporting moral norms.
关键词：Justification of morality;Reciprocity;Equality;Interests;Universalism vs. particularism
