期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Business School, University of Strathclyde
出版年度：2012
卷号：2012
出版社：University of Strathclyde
摘要：This paper provides a rationale for group support for political vio- lence when violence does not provide a material bene t. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilib- rium in a game containing psychological payo¤s. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payo¤s are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence be- cause the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacri ce in choosing peace.
