期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Business School, University of Strathclyde
出版年度：2013
卷号：2013
出版社：University of Strathclyde
摘要：We investigate competition for FDI within a region when a foreign multinational rm can pro tably exploit di erences in statutory corporate tax rates by shifting taxable pro ts to lower-tax jurisdictions. In such framework we show that targeted tax competition may lead to higher welfare for the region as a whole than lump-sum subsidies when the di erence in statutory corporate tax rates and/or their average is high enough. Tax competition is also preferable from an eciency point of view (overall surplus) by changing the rm's investment decision when pro t shifting motivations induce the rm to locate in the (before tax) least pro table country.
关键词：Policy competition for FDI; Pro t shifting; Tax discrimination
