期刊名称：Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine
印刷版ISSN：0350-2791
电子版ISSN：1847-4489
出版年度：2013
卷号：39.
期号：1 (77)
页码：243-261
语种：Croatian
出版社：Institut za filozofiju
摘要：n this paper, evidence is collected to support the thesis that Stadler’s neo-Thomist psychology is intellectualist in nature. Most clearly manifested in his faculty psychology, Stadler’s intellectualism is essentially based on the following three principles: first, faculties cannot perform the operations of each other (e. g. senses cannot perform intellective operations, intellect cannot perform volitive operations, will cannot perform cognitive operations, etc.); second, nothing can be desired or willed unless it be foreknown as good (in other words, desire depends on what has already been cognitively grasped as good); third, the cognition of what is good completely precedes desire, and hence cannot be influenced by it (in other words, the cognitive powers of sense and intellect operate fully independently of desire, even when it goes about grasping what is good).
