La discusión sobre si debe existir un tribunal internacional de insolvencia refleja el punto de vista de los acreedores. Se concibe la quiebra de las naciones como si fueran empresas. Aquí se propone que los países no quiebran: es necesario un nuevo mecanismo para distinguir los componentes que motivan la cesación de pagos. Los acreedores deben suspender los cobros para someterse a un tratamiento simétrico ante un tribunal independiente de arbitraje. Para impedir nuevas crisis de deuda, la totalidad de la deuda debería alcanzar un nivel realmente sustentable.
The discussion over whether an Insolvency Tribunal for countries should be created reflects the point of view of creditors. Countries are conceived of as if they were business firms subject, in consequence, to a Tribunal controlled by the IMF. Here it is argued that countries do not go bankrupt; that we need to create a new legal mechanism capable of determining the different factors that lead to an interruption of payments. When payments are suspended, all creditors should cease to receive payment and accept a symmetrical treatment on behalf of the arbitration tribunal, starting off with an auditing of all the debt obligations and establishing a payments schedule that does not affect social investments or the capacity for internal saving. This would imply guaranteeing repayment on the basis of the debtor´s commercial surplus, thus permitting economic recovery and an eventual return to international financial markets that, with the presence of the Tribunal, would lose their speculative characteristics. In order to prevent new debt crises, the global debt would need to be maintained within sustainable limits.