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  • 标题:Mechanism design with collusive supervision: a three-tier agency model with a continuum of types
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Yutaka Suzuki
  • 期刊名称:Economics Bulletin
  • 电子版ISSN:1545-2921
  • 出版年度:2008
  • 卷号:4
  • 出版社:Economics Bulletin
  • 摘要:We apply the "Monotone Comparative Statics" method ala Topkis (1978), Edlin and Shannon (1998), and Milgrom and Segal (2002)'s generalized envelope theorem to the three-tier agency model with hidden information and collusion ala Tirole (1986, 1992), thereby provide a framework that can address the issues treated in the existing literature, e.g., Kofman and Lawarree (1993)''s auditing application, in a much simpler fashion. In addition to such a technical contribution, the paper derives some clear and robust implication applicable to corporate governance reform (Propositions 1 (2) and 3).
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