首页    期刊浏览 2024年09月14日 星期六
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Cooperative games with size-truncated information
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz
  • 期刊名称:Economics Bulletin
  • 电子版ISSN:1545-2921
  • 出版年度:2014
  • 卷号:34
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:188-200
  • 出版社:Economics Bulletin
  • 摘要:We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the so-called Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k,for any k,and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and onlyif the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, theintersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones.
  • 关键词:Cooperative game; core; Weber set; marginal worth vectors
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有