In this paper, I will deal with Simon Blackburn’s metaethical theory. Blackburn’s metaethics can be described by two ‘-isms’ - projectivism and quasi-realism. In the first part of the paper, I will try to show what the nature of their relation is. In the second part of the paper, I will discuss two reasons Blackburn advances in favor of his projectivism. The first pertains to the simplicity of his position, whereas the second claims that projectivism, unlike cognitivism, can explain the thesis of supervenience of moral features over the natural features. I will try to show that the first argument does not have the strength, and that the second argument does not have the plausibility that Blackburn ascribes to the two. In the third part of the paper, I will point out to probably the hardest problem that every non-cognitivist theory is faced with - the Frege-Geach problem. I will discuss Blackburn’s attempt at a solution, and after that, express some doubts with respect to the proposal that Blackburn puts forward.