期刊名称：American Journal of Industrial and Business Management
印刷版ISSN：2164-5167
电子版ISSN：2164-5175
出版年度：2014
卷号：4
期号：1
页码：40-44
DOI：10.4236/ajibm.2014.41007
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：This paper
develops the basic model of the buy-back contract by introducing the fairness
to investigate how the dominant supplier decides the wholesale price, whether
the buy-back contract can achieve coordination and how the fairness influences
the wholesale price. It is found that, under Stackelberg game between the
retailer and the dominant supplier, the buy-back contract cannot coordinate the
supply chain whether the fairness is incorporated or not. Furthermore, the optimal wholesale price under Stackelberg game
is larger than the initial wholesale price, which can achieve coordination.
Moreover, the optimal wholesale price decreases with the retailer’s fairness, while it increases with the supplier’s fairness.
