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文章基本信息

  • 标题:Bankruptcy Problem Allocations and the Core of Convex Games
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:William Olvera-Lopez ; Francisco Sanchez-Sanchez ; Iván Tellez-Tellez
  • 期刊名称:Economics Research International
  • 印刷版ISSN:2090-2123
  • 电子版ISSN:2090-2131
  • 出版年度:2014
  • 卷号:2014
  • DOI:10.1155/2014/517951
  • 出版社:Hindawi Publishing Corporation
  • 摘要:A well-known result related to bankruptcy problems establishes that a vector is a bankruptcy allocation if and only if it belongs to the core of the associated O’Neill’s bankruptcy game. In this paper we show that this game is precisely the unique TU-game based on convex functions that satisfies the previous result. In addition, given a bankruptcy problem, we show a way for constructing bankruptcy games such that the set of bankruptcy allocations is a subset of their core or their core is a subset of the set of bankruptcy allocations. Also, we show how these results can be applied for finding new bankruptcy solutions.
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