期刊名称：Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
印刷版ISSN：0027-8424
电子版ISSN：1091-6490
出版年度：2014
卷号：111
期号：Supplement 3
页码：10810-10817
DOI：10.1073/pnas.1400823111
出版社：The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
摘要：The replicator equation is the first and most important game dynamics studied in connection with evolutionary game theory. It was originally developed for symmetric games with finitely many strategies. Properties of these dynamics are briefly summarized for this case, including the convergence to and stability of the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. The theory is then extended to other game dynamics for symmetric games (e.g., the best response dynamics and adaptive dynamics) and illustrated by examples taken from the literature. It is also extended to multiplayer, population, and asymmetric games.
