摘要：In his 1973 paper, Steven Cheung discredited the "fable of the bees" by demonstratingthat markets for beekeeping services exist and that they function well. Although economistsheeded Cheung's lessons, policy makers did not. The honey program—the stated purpose ofwhich was to promote the availability of pollination services—operated for almost 50 years,supporting the price of honey through a variety of mechanisms. Its effects were minor before the1980s but then became important with annual government expenditures near $100 million forseveral years. Reforms of the program in the late 1980s reduced its market effects and budgetcosts, returning it to its original role as a minor commodity program. The 1996 Farm Billformally eliminated the honey program, which redirected lobbying efforts toward enacting traderestrictions and obtaining annual relief through the appropriations process. We measure thehistorical welfare effects of the program during its various incarnations, examine its frequentlystated public interest rationale—the encouragement of honeybee pollination, and interpret itshistory in light of economic theories of regulation.
