摘要：The 1996 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture was a step toward free trade. TheAgreement lifts bans and quotas on imports, but allows their conversion into tariff-ratequotas (TRQs), which function like quotas. At present, many of the 1,300 TRQsincreased market access to imports, but some have preserved pre-Agreement levels ofprotection. The World Trade Organization's intent as to the administration of TRQs isopen to interpretation. This report analyzes seven administrative methods in light ofthe principle of nondiscrimination. We conclude that auctions are the best way toadminister a TRQ. First-come, first-served and license-on-demand methods present amoderate risk of biased trade. State trading organizations and producer groups thatdirectly administer TRQs can also bias trade. Historical allocation is the method mostlikely to be discriminatory. Two case studies illustrate our conclusion.
