摘要：We analyse efficiency problems of incentive-compatible contracts under moralhazard and/ or adverse selection in the context of private resource management. The papercontributes to defining the regulatory role in creating an optimal information environmentbetween regulator and private resource managers to maximize welfare from a mixed public-private good. The optimal contract structures developed in a principal-agent frameworkinduce self-selection and type-specific conservation efforts. The associated contractinginefficiencies, however, are increasing in the degree of information asymmetry acrossscenarios, the total costs of conservation, and the difference in conservation costs acrosstypes. The results of this study imply that conservation contracts to mitigate problems ofmoral hazard and adverse selection are welfare improving if efficiency gains from privatemanagement outweigh the inefficiencies associated with incentive compatible contractdesign. Alternatively, the regulator can choose to retain information on 'types' and 'effort'during institutional transformations.
