摘要：Labor markets in all economies are subject to transaction costs associated with recruiting,monitoring and supervising workers. Rural labor markets in developing economies, where institutions suchas labor and contract law and formal employment assistance mechanisms are not in place, are regarded tobe particularly sensitive to transaction cost conditions. The inherent difficulty of measuring transactioncosts has limited studies on this topic.In this paper, we analyze supervision activities reported in a cross-section survey of rice farmersin the Bicol region of the Philippines. This survey is unique because it provides supervision data at thefarm task level. We present a simple optimization model in which supervision intensity increases theproductivity of hired workers, which is assumed to be lower than that of family members due to thetransaction costs. The model predicts that supervision intensity will increase with transaction costs. Weuse different institutional conditions to proxy for transaction costs, and estimate the demand for supervisiontime for four different classes of rice production tasks. The estimation strategy controls for selectivity inboth hiring and supervising. The results show a positive effect of transaction costs on supervisionintensity.We then extend the analysis to a farm efficiency specification to test the proposition thatsupervision activities improve farm efficiency. This framework allows us to relate institutional conditionsto farm efficiency directly and indirectly through their effect on supervision activities. We find thattransaction costs have a negative direct effect on farm efficiency, but this is partially offset by the positiveefficiency effects of increased supervision intensity. The results enable us to associate institutionalconditions with transaction costs and to draw policy inferences regarding the value of improvedinstitutional conditions.
