摘要：Much of the rangeland management policies the world over have been directed towards private ownership of rangelands. In the historically pastoral societies of Africa, tenure reforms (away from the commons and toward private tenure) have often been justified on the argument that pastoralists overstock, overgraze and damage the rangeland resources...because of the mismanagement inherent in the traditional patterns of communal rangeland tenure combined with individual herd ownership--along the lines of the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968 cited in Homewood and Rodgers, 1988). Following this line of reasoning, many economic consultants and planners, as well as researchers (Johnson, 1972 and Picardi, 1974 cited in Runge, 1981; and Demsetz, 1967; Anderson and Hill, 1977; Libecap, 1981 cited in Stevenson, 1991) have often prescribed private property as the only solution to this (overgrazing) “tragedy of the commons”. In other words, they advocate for the imposition of private property schemes as a means of “internalizing” a common property externality. Underlying such a prescription is the belief that privatization is necessary and sufficient to solve the commons dilemma (Ostrom, 1990).
