摘要:This paper investigates the strategic behavior between countries that havepurchasing power on the world market for a certain good. Tariffs and quotas are notequivalent protection instruments in this oligopsonistic market. Policy active importerswould be better off by colluding and setting their trade instrument cooperatively. In anon-cooperative setting, if production decisions occur before consumption decisions, theex-ante optimal policy is not time consistent because the ex-post elasticity of the residualforeign export supply curve is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. However, we show thatthe importers' inability to irrevocably commit to their trade instrument may be welfaresuperior to the precommitment solution. The negative welfare implication of non-cooperative behavior may be balanced off by the welfare effect of the ex-post elasticity.A numerical example is proposed to provide insights on the theoretical results.
关键词:Precommitment; time consistency; optimal tariff and quota; oligopsony