摘要：Environmental regulations implemented by administrative agencies have often been met withfierce political resistance from regulated parties. In some instances, regulated parties have turnedto legislative and judicial bodies for relief from environmental regulation. As these political andlegal battles have escalated, several forms of compromises have evolved. The U.S. Fish andWildlife Service, in its administration of the Endangered Species Act, has often utilized the tool of"Habitat Conservation Planning" as a means by which some regulatory relief is granted inexchange for an agreement by the regulated party to undertake mitigation measures to aidendangered or threatened species. As a further inducement for regulated parties to enter into theHabitat Conservation Planning process, the Service has also adopted a "No Surprises" policy ofguaranteeing regulated parties that if certain additional mitigation measures are taken, then if inthe future any further mitigation measures are deemed necessary to protect endangered orthreatened species, they will only be undertaken at the expense of the Service. This paperdevelops simple models of the conditions under which such compromise agreements are offeredby a regulator, and the conditions under which the regulated party either accepts such an offer orpursues a strategy of appealing to legislative or judicial bodies for relief from regulation.
