摘要：The effect of insecure ownership on ordinary investment and on the exploitation ofnatural resources is examined. Insecure ownership is characterized as a positive probabilitythat a typical asset or its future return will be confiscated. For empirical analysis, theprobability of confiscation is modeled as a function of observable political attributes ofcountries, principally the type of government regime in power (democratic versus non-democratic) and the prevalence of political violence or instability. A general index ofownership security is estimated from the political determinants of economy wide investmentrates, and then introduced into models of petroleum and forest use. Ownership risk is found tohave a significant, and quantitatively important effect. Empirically, increases in ownership riskare associated with reductions in forest cover and with slower rates of petroleum exploration.Contrary to conventional wisdom, greater ownership risk tends to slow rates of petroleumextraction, apparently because the extraction process is capital intensive.
