摘要：In the realm of environmental policy instrument choice, there is great divergencebetween the recommendations of normative economic theory and positive political reality.Four gaps stand out. First, despite the advantages of market-based policy instruments, theyhave been used to a minor degree, compared with conventional, command-and-controlinstruments. Second, pollution-control standards have typically been much more stringent fornew than for existing sources, despite the inefficiency of this approach. Third, in the fewinstances in which market-based instruments have been adopted, they have nearly always takenthe form of grandfathered tradeable permits, rather than auctioned permits or pollution taxes,despite the advantages in some situations of these other instruments. Fourth, the politicalattention given to market-based environmental policy instruments has increased dramatically inrecent years. We search for explanations for these four apparent anomalies by drawing uponintellectual traditions from economics, political science, and law. We find that all fit quite wellwithin an equilibrium framework, based upon the metaphor of a political market. In general,explanations from economics tend to refer to the demand for environmental policy instruments,while explanations from political science refer to the supply side. Overall, we find that thereare compelling theoretical explanations for the four apparent anomalies, although thesetheories have yet to be empirically verified.
