摘要：I n the late 1980s, grain elevators in Ohio developed the hedge-to-arrive contract (HT A) to induce farmers to use their grain handling facilities and/or merchandising services. Farmers wanted to use HTAs to lock in abnormally attractive price levels for more years of expected production. Supposedly, the multiple-year HTA would lock in those attractive prices without farmer margin calls (money required by commodi ty brokers as security against default) if futures prices rose further. A National Grain and Feed Association survey in early 1996 found that 45 percent of responding elevators offered single or multiyear HTAs, accounting for 6 percent of their grain volume. Many multiyear HTAs proved to be an economic disaster in 1996 when corn prices skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. The false premise underlying the contract design, which we discuss in this article, became exposed in dramatic fashion. How did this disaster happen? How might it be prevented in the future?"??
